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Abstract. There is fundamental difference between a simple e-tender box and a traditional physical
tender box. Access to the e-tender box has become a private activity in contrast with the public access to
a traditional tender box. A significant opportunity is therefore created for malicious business collusion by
use of a simple e-tender box even though it may have cryptographic keys. This indicates that a different
approach to the e-tender box is needed. This paper presents a secure e-tender submission protocol to
address the advanced security requirements in e-tender submission. The principles of commitment
schemes have been applied to the protocol design to prevent submission time dispute and collusion
between favoured parties. The protocol is assumed to run under the condition that all tendering parties
(principal and tenderers) are dishonest players. The security analysis shows that the protocol meets its
security goals under well known colluding scenarios.
1 Introduction
Tendering is a process used in awarding government contracts. The tendering process is governed
mostly by contract law. The basic components in the tendering process are performed in sequential
order as shown in Fig. 1. The components are pre-qualification and registration, public invitation,
tender preparation and submission, close of tender, opening tender, tender evaluation, award of
tender, and archiving. Any tenderer has to ensure that its tender is submitted before the tender
close time. The opening of tenders occurs after the tender close time.
Tender submission close timeTender invatation
Pre−qualification and registration
Tender preparation and submission period
Tender opening time Award tender
Archiving
Tender evaluation period
Time line
Fig. 1. Tendering Process
An electronic tendering (e-tendering) system is usually considered to be more efficient and
cost-effective than the traditional paper based system. Demand has generated a large number of
e-tendering systems around the world. In general, most of the current e-tendering systems mirror
some paper based process with untested security and legal compliance. An e-tendering system
with inadequate security provides opportunities for fraud and collusion by parties both inside and
outside of the process. As an example, submitted tenders are highly confidential and are commonly
the target of business collusion when a tenderer attempts to obtain its competitor’s tender offer
before opening time. To prevent this type of collusion requires implementing an advanced security
protocol going beyond basic security services such as confidentiality and data integrity.
An electronic tender box has been included in most fielded e-tender systems to collect submitted
tenders before the tender opening time. Various in-house solutions have been used to protect the e-
tender box but the common problem with these solutions is that the system administrator still has
the full capacity to tamper with the submitted tenders. Although a secure e-contracting protocol has
been proposed [4] to maintain the integrity of the e-tendering process, adequate security solutions
for the e-tender submission phase remains undiscussed.
Our contribution is to provide a secure e-tender submission protocol, suitable as a stand-alone
protocol or for integrating with more general protocols for e-tender security [4]. Our protocol
addresses the special security requirements related to e-tender submission, such as resistance to
collusion. The next section discusses the security requirements related to e-tender submission. We
then review the background technicalities in Section 3 before describing our new protocol in Section
4. Section 5 explains why the security goals are met by our protocol.
2 E-Tender Submission Security Requirements
Traditionally the tender submission has been carried out by using a tender box placed in a public
area. Tenderers submit their tenders into the tender box before submission close time. The tender
box is normally opened at the submission close time. Tenders that are submitted on time will
be publicly recorded. Any later submission is considered as a non-conforming tender and will be
rejected. Making the tender box publicly accessible increases the transparency of the process.
A simple e-tender box does not function in the same way as a traditional tender box. The
simple e-tender box is typically a directory in a system server, which allows tenderers to upload
their tender offer to that directory. The fundamental difference is that access to the e-tender box
has become a private activity and cannot be publicly monitored, thus removing transparency. A
significant opportunity has been created for business collusion by using a simple e-tender box even
though access to it may be protected by cryptographic keys.
The time of receipt of the electronically submitted tender is another vulnerability for the system.
The integrity of time of receipt could be compromised by both receiver and senders if there were no
security mechanism in place. An uncontrolled closing time can provide an opportunity for collusion
and lead to unfair trading practices. Moreover, any late submission should be identified as a non-
conforming tender. The alteration of the submission or receiving time can raise a dispute as to
whether a tender conforms or not.
Even when the communications process is cryptographically protected to provide confidentiality
and integrity of all communications, colluding parties (the principal and its favoured tenderer) may
recalculate all related value to hide their alteration of existing documents. This collusion exists
because of the special nature of the tendering process. In a normal sales contract, seller and buyer
try to maximize their own benefits. In tendering, when one of the tenderers (sellers) is the principal’s
favourite, there is a tendency to alter submitted tenders (price or other items) to change the winning
contract.
Any e-tender system requires a number of basic security services to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of tendering information and authenticate parties [4]. However, the e-tender submis-
sion process faces specific threats illustrated in the following three risk scenarios.
Scenario 1 The principal releases tender submissions to its favourite tenderer before tender sub-
mission closing time or in between tender submission close and opening time. The principal’s
favourite tenderer can then submit a competitive tender and win the tender project.
Scenario 2 The principal allow its favourite tenderer to alter its tender after the tender official
opening time. The changed tender then becomes competitive and wins the tender project. This
alteration is not limited to only price change.
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Scenario 3 A dispute may occur between the principal and any of the tenderers over whether any
tender submission happened before tender submission closing time. This may allow a tenderer
to submit a late tender without risking rejection, thereby gaining an advantage over other
tenderers.
Consideration of these threat scenarios leads to the following security requirements for electronic
tender submission.
Submission hiding ensures that no party can reveal any electronically submitted e-tender doc-
ument before the designated tender opening time. This is to prevent any party from gaining
another party’s tender strategy before tender close time.
Submission binding detects whether any party altered any tender submission after tender closing
time. This is to prevent business collusion between the principal and its favoured tenderer.
Submission time integrity service ensures that time of tender submission can be recorded in a
reliable manner. This is to provide reliable evidence to determine whether a tender submission
is on time.
3 Related Technologies and Application Issues
Digital signature schemes, commitment schemes and time stamping services are useful crypto-
graphic technologies for the e-tender submission protocol. The commitment function will be used
to generate a document integrity checksum for the tender submission process. The protection of
the checksum is provided by using a digital signature during the tender submission process. Time
stamp will be provided by time stamp authority (TSA) to protect all parties’ commitments.
3.1 Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme [3] is a protocol between two parties called the prover P and the verifier
V . There are two phases. In the commitment phase P provides V with the commitment C(m) to
the message m. In the opening phase P provides V with the value m and V can verify whether
or not it is a correct opening of C. Commitment schemes are typically constructed from one-way
functions. For example, the commitment function C(m) = gm relies on the difficulty of the discrete
log function. Given the value m the V can re-compute gm to check the commitment. There are two
basic but essential properties to any commitment scheme.
1. The hiding property prevents V from revealing the commited value m in the protocol commit-
ment phase.
2. The binding property prevents P from changing its committed value m after commitment
phase.
We can apply the concept of the commitment scheme to e-tender submissions to ensure that
the principal cannot reveal a tenderers’ tender before tender opening time, and tenderers cannot
change their submissions after the tender close time.
A commitment function can provide either unconditional or computational assurance of hiding
and binding. The binding property can be unconditional binding or computational binding. For
example, the commitment function C(m) = gm provides unconditional binding since (with suitable
conditions on g and m) there is only one possible value of m given C(m). Therefore even with
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unlimited computational power, it would be impossible for the prover P to change its mind after
committing. However, this same function provides only computational hiding since if V has sufficient
computational power to take discrete logs V can reveal m before it is opened by P . There are also
commitment functions which in contrast have unconditional hiding and computational binding [7].
However, it is not hard to show that no commitment scheme can provide both unconditional hiding
and unconditional binding.
In choosing commitment schemes, we must balance the level of assurance for e-tender submission
according to its legal purposes. The submitted tender offer is the document that must be preserved
over the long term as a requirement for archiving purposes. It is preferable to choose a scheme that
provides unconditional binding assurance. Although in tender submission (commitment) phase, only
computational hiding is provided, the period between submission and tender opening time will be
within a few hours. It is significantly shorter than the period between tender opening and awarding
time (maybe days or months), and particularly shorter than the document archiving requirements
(years). Therefore the binding property is the one that will be required longer, and so should be
given the higher assurance.
Role of Players All commitment schemes assume that prover P and verifier V are adversaries.
The scheme will provide hiding and binding properties only if no collusion occurs between P and V
players. When it is applied to e-tender submission protocol, we must analyze players in the protocol
and determine adversaries for a commitment function at each stage of the e-tender submission.
When collusion happens, the principal is not necessarily a trustable verifier.
For an e-tendering submission, players can be honest or dishonest, colluding parties are dishon-
est parties and non-colluding parties may be honest or dishonest. The non-colluding parties are
opponents of colluding parties. It is very important that the role of verifier V in a commitment
scheme be assigned to an honest player or at least to an opponent of the dishonest players.
It must be assumed that all tendering related parties are dishonest players, principal A and
tenderers B. In a real situation, it is very difficult to determine at what point which party is honest,
therefore their commitments preferably should be held by trusted third parties. At this point, it
will be a good strategy to introduce time stamping service.
For example, if principal A colludes with its favourite tenderer Bfav ∈ B, A and Bfav are collud-
ing parties. Other parties with which the principal has no intention to collude become opponents,
which includes all other tenderers Bopp ⊂ B, trusted third parties and time stamp authorities.
In a colluding situation, colluding parties will be the prover P and their opponents are verifier
V . It clearly indicates that non-colluding parties have to hold colluding parties’ commitments. This
will raise the credibility of a verifying process in the protocol.
3.2 Time Stamping Services
The function of a time stamping service is to reduce disputes over document generation time. Time-
stamping services have been defined by many researchers [2, 6, 8]. The definition of a time stamp is
digital data intended to prove the existence of digital documents prior to or at a specified time.
In general, a time stamp service requires that a client send a request to a service provider
through the Internet to gain a time stamp for a document. The service provider issues the time
stamp of the document and sends it back to the requester. Other processes could be involved,
such as the service provider publishing the time stamp to enhance the service integrity. If a dispute
4
occurs at a later time, the integrity of the time stamp and related document will be verified through
verification procedures associated with each time stamp scheme.
Time-stamping technology has been studied for more than a decade [5]. Traditionally it has been
classified into two types according to its issuing process: conventional/simple and linking schemes. If
a trusted third party involved in issuing process, Haber [5] also proposed a distributed trust scheme.
For systematic security analysis of time stamp schemes, Une and Matsumoto [9, 8] performed fine
grained classification based on many aspects involved in time stamping other then just issuing
process. Regardless of the significant body of research [1, 2], all time stamping services require that
a requester and issuer do not collude [9]. The hybrid time stamping service with hardware support
and linked schemes will largely limit the capacity for collusion between requester and issuer.
4 Protocol Description
The secure e-tender submission protocol meets the special security requirements of a tender sub-
mission. It addresses the issues of time disputes, and tender collusion between a principal and its
favorite tenderer. The protocol description section will discuss protocol structure, elements required
for verifying process, message integrity verifying process, and define protocol security goals.
4.1 Notation
Commonly used notations in the protocol are listed in Fig 2. The commitment function commit()
will represent any function such as gm (when unconditional binding is required, gmhr (Pedersen’s
scheme [7]) when unconditional hiding is required, or h(m) for some one-way hash function h,
when efficiency is most important. Party A represents the principal in the tender process. Party B
represents a tenderer in the set of all potential tenderers B.
SYMBOL NAME
−→ One party sends another party a message eg. B −→ A, B send to A
←→ two way communication
‖ Concatenation
TSA (Time Stamp Authority)
PrivID Private key of party ID eg. PrivB , B’s private key
PubID Public key of party ID
CID Certificate of party ID
commit commitment function
Sig Signature generation function
V Signature verifying function
Ex Asymmetrical encryption function, x represents input key
Dx Asymmetrical decryption function, x represents input key
ms Tender submission message in the contract negotiation
Fig. 2. Notation
4.2 E-Tender Submission Protocol
The e-tender submission protocol contains processes for tender submission, close of tender and
opening of tender. E-tender submission protocol (Fig 3) contains the following steps:
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TSA A(Principal) B(Tenderer) TSA
Ls = commit(ms‖Ls−1)
σsB = Sig(Ls, P rivB)
get TSs
←→
Ms = EPubA(Ls‖σsB‖TSs)‖CB
Ms←−
(Ls‖σsB) = DPrivA(Ms)
if VPubB (σsB , Ls) = 1
if VPubT SA (TSs, Ls) = 1
σsA = SigPrivA(Ls)
RSPs = EPubB (σsA)‖CA
RSPs
−→
(σnA) = DPrivB (RSPs)
if VPubA(σsA, Ls) = 1
—— tender submission close time ——
Lpl = (LsB1‖LsB2...‖LsBi...‖LsBj)
σplA = SigPrivA(Lpl)
get TSpl
←→
Mpl = EPubB (Lpl‖σplA‖TSpl)‖CA
Mpl
−→
(Lpl‖σplA‖TSpl) = DPrivB (Mpl)
if VPubA(σplA, Lpl) = 1 and
if VPubT SA (TSpl, Lpl) = 1 and
B check LsBi = Ls, with LsBi ∈ Lpl
σplB = Sig(Lpl, P rivB)
Lfs = commit(ms‖Lpl)
σfs = Sig(Lfs, P rivB)
Mfs = EPubA(ms‖σplB‖σfsB)‖CB
Mfs
←−
(ms‖σplB‖σfsB) = DPrivA (Mfs)
if VPubB (σplB , Lpl) = 1 and
if commit(ms‖Ls−1) = Ls, where
Ls ∈ Lpl and
calculate L′
fs
= commit(ms‖Lpl) and
if VPubB (σfsB , L
′
fs
) = 1
σfsA = SigPrivA(Lfs)
RSPfs = EPubB (σfsA)‖CA
RSPfs
−→
(σfsA) = DPrivB (RSPfs)
if VPubA(σfsA, Lfs) = 1
—— tender opening time ——
Fig. 3. Tender Submission Sub-Protocol
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1. every tenderer B requests a timestamp TSB for its signed commitment σsB of its offer mB,
encrypts the timestamp and signature, and sends them to principal A before tender close time.
A will verify the signatures, TSs, σsB and send its confirmation RSPs including σsA to each
tenderer B.
2. At the tender closing time, A concatenates all received commitment and requests a timestamp
for the concatenation (TSpl). It then sends timestamps TSpl and concatenated commitments to
all tenderers who have submitted offers (tenders). The message also acts as a call from principal
A to all tenderers to submit their full document (offer).
3. On receiving Mpl, each tenderer extracts and verifies all commitments and signatures and sends
its encrypted full tender document mB and other relevant values.
4. A extracts the documents mB for each B and verifies the signatures, generates signature σfsA
for the node Lfs, and send RSPfs = EPubB(σfsA)‖CA to each B.
5. each B will verify the confirmation and tender can be opened.
Step 1 is the tender submission process, step 2 is the tender closing process, steps 3 and 4 are
the tender opening process. Once all full tender documents are received, tenders can be officially
opened.
5 Security Analysis
We summarise the required security goals of the protocol:
1. the principal A and its favourite tenderer Bfav cannot reveal other tenderers tender value ms
using C = commit(ms) before tender opening time.
2. any alteration of ms after tender opening time can be detected by the verification process.
3. any alteration of time stamping value TSs and TSpl can be detected by the verification process.
We assume that all players (principal and tenderers) are dishonest players. They have intercep-
tion, insertion and alteration powers at any stage of the protocol run.
Interception Power: is the power to intercept all parties’ network messages in order to gain other
parties tendering strategies.
Insertion Power is the power to insert malicious messages into network at the protocol run.
For example they can replay/relay intercepted messages or insert extra tender values during
protocol run.
Alteration Power: is the power to manipulate (alter, delete, and insert) all protocol generated
elements belonging to them. It includes: set of communicated messages, set of signatures from
message originator and receiver, set of time-stamps from TSA, set of signatures from trusted
third party. All these elements are listed in Fig 3.
5.1 Protocol Assumptions
Protocol assumptions define a set of security conditions that an running environment should provide
for e-tender submission protocol.
– Time Stamp Authority (TSA) are trusted parties and generate reliable time-stamp.
– If commit(m) = commit(m′), it implies m = m′, for commit() is a commitment function;
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– If SigPriv(commit(m)) = SigPriv′(commit(m)
′), it implies commit(m) = commit(m)′, and
Priv = Priv′;
– Keys are securely stored and no party will intentionally release its private keys to any other
(non-colluding) party participating in the tendering;
– No party will consciously sign anything that they do not agree upon. Players will ensure that
communicated messages for tender submission are in the following order: time stamped com-
mitment of offer, time stamped group of commitments of offers, and full document of tender
offer.
– Verifying (challenging) procedures are transparent, run in the public by trusted third party,
such as court and judges;
– Supplied verifying (challenging) elements are publicly available during the verifying process;
5.2 Analysis
A dishonest player attempts to gain financial benefit through those defined attacks by using the
powers described above. These attacks are deemed successful only if they cannot be detected by
verification procedures and the dishonest player gains financial benefit through the attack.
Hiding Tender Submission The protocol prevents a dishonest principal and its favourite ten-
derer from gaining other tenderers tender strategy during tender submission process, and before
tender opening time. This will prevent Bfav submitting a more competitive tender, by knowing
their tender price, than other tenderers Bopp .
The secure e-tender submission protocol only require all tenderers to submit the commitment
values of their full tender documents. The colluding principal has power to access every parties
commitments and pass them to its favourite tenderer. However, if the commitment function provides
hiding property, no tender strategy can be obtained from the commitment value. The protocol uses
the hiding property to prevent colluding party from revealing opponents’ tender value ms before
tender opening time.
Binding Tender Submission The protocol also tries to prevent colluding parties successfully
changing their commitment during tender opening process by detecting the alteration through
protocol verification process.
In this situation, the colluding parties will change Bfav’s tender ms to a competitive value m
′
s
after all tenderers have submitted their full tender documents. To cover this alteration, they would
need to recalculate all related values (in Fig3) to avoid attack from being detected. The colluding
parties, however, cannot recalculate time stamps TSs and TSpl.
Therefore verification process will detect that VPubTSA(TSs, L
′
s) 6= 1 and VPubTSA(TSpl, L
′
pl) 6= 1,
with TSs and TSpl supplied by time stamping authority TSA. The non-colluding tenderers Bopp
also hold the principal’s commitment Lpl and TSpl.
The binding property of commitment scheme is able to detect alteration of committed values
ms. The colluding parties cannot change ms to m
′
s without detection, therefore rendering the attack
unsuccessful.
Fixing Submission Time To prevent dispute over submission time of a commitment, all parties
are required to obtain a time stamp for their commitments. The protocol assume that TSA is a
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trustable party - therefore time stamps TSs and TSpl are trustable values. The dispute can be
resolved by examining whether TSs ≤ closetime ≤ TSpl, with TSA supplying the TSs and TSpl.
The integrity of TSs and TSpl can also be verified.
6 Conclusion
There is fundamental difference between a simple e-tender box and the traditional physical tender
box. This leads to a range of new security threats, particularly those including collusion between
the principal and one or more tenderers. This paper has presented a secure e-tender submission
protocol for providing advanced security service to prevent risks and collusions related in e-tender
submission.
The e-tender submission phase is a commitment scheme. It must allow the player to submit
their tender commitment without revealing the tender value before the tender opening time. It
also should not allow the tenderer to subsequently change their commitment. The security analysis
shows that the protocol achieves its security goals in preventing identified security risks. By using
different commitment schemes it is possible to make either the binding of committed tenders or
the hiding of committed tenders unconditionally strong. Given the long-term use of the committed
tenders we recommend that the binding should be made unconditional. Further study can use
formal method to investigate actions which may breach the security goals.
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